In an infinitely repeated intraindustry trade game governments improve on the static prisoners dilemma outcome of the Brander and Spencer (1985) 
INTRODUCTION
ountries that participated in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) spent years negotiating multilateral tariff reductions and export subsidy elimination. As GATT evolved into the World Trade Organization (WTO) the agenda items, tariff reduction and export subsidy elimination, did not change. That these policy items have remained so prominent through time is not coincidental, since nearly two-hundred years of economic analysis has shown that in most circumstances free trade will be welfare improving. One exception to the free trade rule are goods that trade in an intraindustry setting, as defined by Brander and Spencer (1985) [henceforth B&S].
While B&S were not the first to notice the model intraindustry trade patterns, their model has become the workhorse of the intraindustry trade literature. An important conclusion of B&S's analysis is that free trade is not an equilibrium outcome. However, as shown by Collie (1993) , for example, once the static model of B&S is cast into the dynamic setting of an infinitely repeated game free trade can be restored to its equilibrium status. We show that active policy, in the form of an export tax, will lead to Pareto improvements relative to free trade. Moreover, we also prove that an export tax is the only policy that leads to a Pareto improvement relative to free trade.
A variation of the B&S trade model serves as the stage game in our infinitely repeated trade setting. We demonstrate that free trade will increase the value taken by the social benefit function, relative to an infinite repetition of the static B&S equilibrium, in two separate circumstances. First, when firms are allowed to collude free trade will place governments on the Pareto frontier of the Feasible and Individually Rational Set (FIRS). Second, if firms are not able to collude free trade will still increase the value taken by the social benefit function, even though governments will be inside their FIRS. Consequently, a Pareto improvement is possible. We demonstrate that only an export tax will lead to a Pareto improvement relative to free trade for the governments in the absence of firm collusion. Thus, free trade and an export tax both Pareto dominate an infinite repetition of B&S's static export subsidy.
Our dynamic setting is similar to the model constructed by Collie (1993) . Using this model we demonstrate that free trade is a subgame perfect outcome in the infinitely repeated setting. This result is not new since Collie (1993) also reached this conclusion. However, we extend Collie (1993) by proving that an export tax will generate a Pareto improvement for governments relative to free trade, in the absence of collusion. Collie (1993) alludes to this fact; however, no proof is offered in his writing.
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The present work is similar to Fung (1991) , and Lommerud and Sorgard (2001) in only one respect. Like these authors we use a variation of the B&S's model as a stage game in an infinitely repeated game of intraindustry trade. These authors analyze the impact of collusion, which is viable in an infinitely repeated game, on the firms' trade relation. We analyze a very different problem. We assume that international relations prohibit collusion between firms. This prohibition restricts firms, in our setting, to Cournot behavior. Cournot competition and the absence of collusion will place governments in the interior of their FIRS. Governments move toward the Pareto frontier only if they collude in trade policy. The collusion by governments will generate a Pareto improvement relative to free trade.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section two the model is developed. In section three we present the main results of this paper. In section four we extend the results of section three to a more robust setting. In section four we offer conclusions.
MODEL
The model is a variation of the B&S model. There are four players, two governments and two firms, that we model is an extensive form game. Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} represent this set of players, where player 1 is the domestic governments, and player 3 is a domestic firm. Similarly, player 2 is a foreign government, and player 4 is a foreign firm.
In this extensive form game governments move first. Governments will choose a trade policy, either an export subsidy or an export tax. Once trade policy is in place firms compete in output in a common third market, with no sale or consumption of their output in either producing country. 
for j = 3, 4, represents the payoff function of firm j. In (2) s j-2 represents an export subsidy/tax offered to firm j by their respective government. The parameter c < a is the constant cost per unit, which is identical for both firms. Thus, the entire expression represents the profit earned by each firm.
Governments will choose an export subsidy, s i  0, or tax, s i  0. Each government will choose a trade policy from the compact interval S i = [-(a -c)/2, (a -c)}, for i = 1, 2. 1 Because good x is consumed in a third country each government's social benefit function,
is the sum of the respective domestic firm's profit and the revenues collected or spent on trade policy.
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The game that has been described is a static extensive form game with a unique solution. (5) in payoff.
We now construct an infinitely repeated version of the static model described above. The above model will serve as a stage game for our infinitely repeated game. It should be noted that this stage game has two steps, where we use the term step as defined by Wen (2002) .
The average discounted sum
describes each player payoff in the infinitely repeated game. The parameter 0 ≤ δ < 1 represents each players discount factor. The discount factor measures a player's patients, or time cost. Note that the average discounted sum is the same functional form used in the proof of Friedman's (1971) and Fudenberg and Maskin's (1986) Folk theorems. Consequently, the implications of this functional form can be found in Fudenberg and Tirole (1992) for example.
Folk theorems are used to classify the set of subgame perfect equilibria of an infinitely repeated game. The proofs of these theorems are constructive; thus, the proofs describe how to construct the subgame perfect equilibria. Friedman's (1971) theorem is used to construct subgame perfect equilibria that strictly Pareto dominate an infinite repetition of the static Nash equilibrium. Fudenberg and Maskin's (1986) folk theorem demonstrates that for a sufficiently large δ any payoff in the FIRS is subgame perfect.
Either folk theorem could be used is sections 3 and 4, since we are not concerned with the actual construction of subgame perfect equilibria. We are instead concerned with a set of potential equilibria and the properties of that set. However, the folk theorems of Friedman (1971) and Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) do guarantee that the set that we analyze will be subgame perfect for some value of δ.
The structure of this game can be fully analyzed using the payoff functions g i , this is so because the payoffs in the infinitely repeated game are defined as the average discounted sum of the per period payoffs. Let 
where (x 3, x 4 )  X (s 1 , s 1 ), to be the EFIRS. When using Friedman's argument to construct a subgame perfect equilibrium a feasible payoff must come from this set. Otherwise step two players may wish to deviate from agreed upon play. Below we restrict firms to the passive behavior of always choosing their Cournot equilibrium given trade policy. This assumption will make the choice between Friedman's (1971) or Fudenberg and Maskin's (1986) irrelevant, when we are constructing subgame perfect strategies.
POLICY ANALYSIS
To simplify the dynamic game assume that firms are not allowed, perhaps by law, to collude, and that this prohibition can be enforced. This will make the firms a passive player in our game, they will take trade policy as given and choose their optimal output as Cournot oligopolists. Given this circumstance governments; will use trade policy to manipulate their social benefit. 

in Figure 1 represents the payoff each government would receive for an infinite repetition of the static Nash equilibrium. Since point B is on the interior of the FIRS it is immediately obvious that a Pareto improvement could be made for both governments. Any Pareto improvement should be welcomed since the point B payoff represents a prisoners dilemma outcome for governments.
Previous work on the infinite repetition of a B&S type game focuses on free trade when constructing a subgame perfect equilibrium. Free trade is a natural target, or a natural focal point, and, as mentioned in the introduction, the policy of choice of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Point A, (γ 2 /(9b), γ 2 /(9b)), in Figure 1 represents the free trade payoff combination for the governments. Obviously, free trade increases social benefit relative to an infinite repetition of the static equilibrium, and eliminates the prisoners dilemma outcome. Just as obvious in Figure 1 is that social benefit could increase relative to the payoff combination of point A. Consequently a Pareto improvement is possible.
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One possible Pareto improvement would be a strategy that leaves player 1 receiving the free trade payoff, but increases player 2's payoff relative to free trade. One such Pareto improvement is defined at point D in Figure 1 . While this point seems arbitrary it will initiate a question regarding policy that we will answer in Proposition 3. We summarize this particular equilibrium in 
Proof. Substitution of s into (14) and (15) results in
Equation (17) is the free trade equilibrium payoff. The boundary of the FIRS is defined by
Substitution of v 1 = g 1 (s) into (19) defines v 2 = g 2 (s), which is greater than the free trade payoff. Together (17) and (18) define point D in Figure 1 . No player is worse off given these payoffs and the foreign government is strictly better off using this strategy. Consequently (17) and (18) define a Pareto improvement.
The policy choice used in Proposition 1 defines a Pareto improvement relative to free trade. At the same time it identifies two interesting points. First, while this outcome is a Pareto improvement, relative to free trade, it is not equitable. The domestic government may be disturbed at the fact that the foreign government is receiving a strictly greater payoff than is the domestic government. The second observation is perhaps more interesting. For this Pareto improvement governments must both use an export tax.
Equity seems to be an issue in trade policy. This is evident in arguments request that firms have an equal playing field in trade. The issue of equity is easily analyzed using the present form of our trade model. To define an equitable Pareto improvement we require that . This payoff is on the Pareto frontier, point C in Figure 1 , and is the same payoff that governments would receive with free trade and firms producing and splitting the joint monopoly output level and profits.
Why should an export tax be preferred to free trade with collusion? Obviously foreign consumers are paying the same price in either case. So it is not a question of income distribution in the export market. It is, however, an issue of income distribution in each of the producing countries. With an export tax income is being redistributed from each producer to their respective government. Thus, the export market provides a source of revenue to each government. With free trade and collusion governments lose this source of revenue, which is transferred to the producers. So there are two components to the solution set, one at and above the "plus" curve and one at and below the "minus" curve, as in Figure 2 . 
We use this second claim to finish. We first note that the solution set to (23) Proposition 3 demonstrates that a Pareto improvement for governments, relative to free trade, requires an export tax.
Switching from a static to a dynamic model of intraindustry trade moved governments out of the prisoners dilemma found in the static game. Elimination of the prisoners dilemma only requires that governments use free trade policy. However, when firms are unable to collude, we have shown that collusion between governments will increase their payoff even more, relative to free trade.
Propositions 2 and 3 demonstrate how a dynamic game shifts the focus of trade policy away from producers, the static case, and places the focus of policy directly on the governments. In the static case foreign consumers and domestic producers gain at the expense of domestic consumers and the domestic government. With free trade and firm's colluding domestic producers gain at the expense of foreign consumers, that are now paying the monopoly price. With an export tax, and firms unable to collude, and if governments can collude each government will gain at the expense of foreign consumers and their respective domestic producer.
Tacit collusion by firms is certainly feasible, especially with price competition. However, not allowing firms to collude is a reasonable supposition, especially with quantity competition. Furthermore, in the United States and the rest of the industrialized world anti trust laws are used to prohibit explicit collusion by firms. Without the ability to collude governments will receive a payoff inside of their FIRS. To move toward the Pareto frontier of the governments FIRS active trade policy, in the form of an export tax, would definitely be feasible.
ASYMMETRIC COSTS
An interesting extension of Proposition 3 would be to analyze a similar trade game in which costs are asymmetric. Costs may differ based on differences in technology in production. However, given the industry structure large cost differentials may not be expected on technology grounds. A very reasonable explanation for cost differences in our trade game would be geographic distance to market.
Suppose that the domestic firm has a constant cost per unit of c 3 and the foreign firm has a constant cost per unit of c 4 . Suppose that c 3 ≠ c 4 . We maintain the assumption that firms cannot collude, they simply choose a Cournot output level given trade policy. Given these assumptions    Choosing S 1 and S 2 in this manner may seem arbitrary. A more natural choice might be for consumers to place a bound on how much they are willing to pay out in subsidies. If firms had a capacity constraint on output a cap may naturally occur as well. While these natural constraints probably exist we maintain that our choice of boundary remains rich enough to give very reasonable outcomes.
If costs are different across firms, the outer boundary of the FIRS will shift, relative to previous analysis. However, the outer bound is still a linear combination of the maximum payoff of each government. The maximum occurs when the government's domestic firm produces as a monopolist. This maximum will be lower for the high cost firm.
Figure 4: FIRS with cost difference across firms
Even with the change in FIRS free trade will still be within the set of feasible and individually rational payoffs, see Figure 4 . Figure 4 represents the FIRS for two different cost combinations. In both cases we assume that c 4 > c 3 . Point A represents one free trade combination. The two rays extending outward from point A are to illustrate that a Pareto improvement is possible, relative to free trade. If c 4 were to rise while c 3 remained constant the free trade position would move to point B. At point B player 1s payoff would increase relative to player 2s; however, a Pareto improvement is still possible relative to point B. However, the free trade payoff   
